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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Before us is Linda Pryzbowski's appeal of two orders of 
the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey: (1) the December 3, 1997 order dismissing her 
claims against U.S. Healthcare for its delay in approving 
requested services after determining that those claims were 
completely preempted under S 502(a) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(a)(1)(B); and (2) the September 8, 1999 order 
granting summary judgment on the state law claims in 
favor of the remaining defendants, Medemer ge, P.A. and Dr. 
John Pilla, Dr. Carol E. Sgambelluri, and Dr. Kent R. Ellis 
("the physician defendants"), on the gr ound that those 
 
                                2 
  
claims were expressly preempted byS 514(a) of ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. S 1144(a). See Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 64 
F. Supp. 2d 361 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 
Our review of the District Court's orders granting 
dismissal and summary judgment based on ERISA 
preemption is plenary. See Travitz v. Northeast Dep't ILGWU 
Health & Welfare Fund, 13 F .3d 704, 708 (3d Cir. 1994). 
When reviewing the order granting dismissal, we must 
accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint 
and draw all reasonable inferences fr om them. See Banks 
v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 419 (3d Cir . 1990). When reviewing 
the order granting summary judgment, we must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and 
may only affirm if there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 




FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
 
Pryzbowski is enrolled in The Health Maintenance 
Organization of New Jersey, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary 
of U.S. Healthcare, Inc. (hereafter "U.S. Healthcare"), which 
is a health maintenance organization ("HMO") offered by the 
employer of Pryzbowski's husband under its employee 
benefit plan within the terms of ERISA. On November 10, 
1993, Pryzbowski sought treatment from Medemerge, her 
primary care provider, for sever e back pains that she had 
been experiencing for several days. Medemerge is a 
physician practice group under contract with U.S. 
Healthcare to provide health care services. Pryzbowski had 
previously undergone numerous sur geries for her back, the 
most recent having been performed by Dr. Giancarlo 
Barolat of Thomas Jefferson University Hospital in 
Philadelphia, all of which were covered under her previous 
health care plan. At Medemerge, she was treated at 
different times by Dr. John Pilla, Dr. Carol E. Sgambelluri, 
and Dr. Kent R. Ellis. 
 
A CT scan performed on November 29, 1993 revealed 
disc degeneration and a large, extra-dural defect 
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compressing the thecal sac, consistent with disc herniation. 
It also showed a previously implanted neur ostimulator. 
Medemerge referred Pryzbowski to Dr . Alan Sarokhan, an 
orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Sarokhan wrote to Dr. Ellis, stating 
that "[s]he certainly needs a neurosur gical evaluation and 
needs one promptly. . . . It is my opinion that she will most 
likely find that the most recent operating surgeon is the 
only one in the area who will be likely to even approach this 
with any confidence." App. J, at J-2. On December 9, 1993, 
Pryzbowski went to see Dr. Aiden Doyle, a neurosurgeon, 
again through a referral from Medemer ge. Dr. Doyle 
concluded, "she should go back to the sur geon who put it 
in. I have discussed this with them and obviously I really 
don't feel that I should be fiddling with that." App. K, at K- 
3. 
 
Based on these two reports, Medemerge sent a request to 
U.S. Healthcare on December 15, 1993 for a consultation 
with Dr. Barolat, who was the neur osurgeon who last 
performed surgery on Pryzbowski. Dr. Barolat was not a 
participant in the particular plan offer ed by U.S. 
Healthcare. Pryzbowski's policy with U.S. Healthcare 
required that it give prior written authorization for services 
by non-participating providers and facilities. U.S. 
Healthcare approved the consultation and Dr. Barolat 
examined Pryzbowski on January 19, 1994. He concluded 
that surgery was needed and that the following specialists 
or specialists' services were requir ed: spinal 
instrumentation and fusion by a separate orthopedic 
surgeon, pulmonary clearance and follow-up fr om Dr. 
Cohen, consultation with the Pain Service, and a 
psychological assessment and follow-up. The specialists to 
whom he referred were also associated with Thomas 
Jefferson University Hospital and outside U.S. Healthcare's 
network. 
 
Over the next few months, Pryzbowski sought to get U.S. 
Healthcare to approve the recommended surgery by Dr. 
Barolat and the related services. In the meantime, 
Pryzbowski was seen by in-network specialists, including 
Dr. Edward Barrett (a mental health specialist), Dr. 
Alexander Levin (a pain management specialist), and Dr. 
M.A. Sarraf (a pulmonary specialist) between February 19, 
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1994 and April 18, 1994, and they transmitted their reports 
thereafter. It is evident that this was not satisfactory to Dr. 
Barolat, because a handwritten note dated May 3, 1994, 
headed "Stephanie - Dr. Barolat's office," states "Dr. will not 
perform the surgery unless specials [sic] at Jefferson in 
consult. USHC will not approve." Appellees' App., Lang 
Certification, Ex. A. U.S. Healthcare authorized the out-of- 
network specialists' services and the back sur gery on June 
30, 1994, and Dr. Barolat perfor med the surgery on 
Pryzbowski on July 7, 1994. Unfortunately, Pryzbowski 
continued to suffer from severe back pain after the surgery. 
Dr. Barolat later opined "that the persistence of the 
excruciating pain . . . was most likely caused by the 
significant delay that occurred between the onset of the 
symptomatology and the surgical intervention." App. M, at 
M-4. 
 
Pryzbowski filed a complaint, later amended, against U.S. 
Healthcare, Medemerge, and three physicians with 
Medemerge in the Superior Court of New Jersey. She 
asserts six counts against U.S. Healthcare, which allege 
that U.S. Healthcare "negligently and car elessly delayed in 
giving its approval for the necessary sur gery which the 
plaintiff . . . urgently needed," causing Pryzbowski severe 
and permanent injury, emotional distress, and future 
expenses for medical care and treatment (Count One); that 
U.S. Healthcare's delay was arbitrary and capricious (Count 
Two); and that, by delaying its approval for the surgery, 
U.S. Healthcare "acted with a willful and wanton disregard 
for the harm that would likely result to the plaintiff " 
(Count Three). The complaint also asserts that U.S. 
Healthcare's delay in approving the sur gery breached its 
health insurance contract with Pryzbowski (Count Four); 
that the delay in surgery approval was"in bad faith" (Count 
Five); and that U.S. Healthcare breached its duty to 
"screen, hire, train and employ capable and responsible 
individuals . . . to make thoughtful and reasonable 
decisions as to healthcare" (Count Seven). 
 
In the five counts Pryzbowski asserts against Medemerge 
and/or the physician defendants, she alleges that 
Medemerge "negligently and carelessly delayed in 
authorizing and/or obtaining authorization fr om U.S. 
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Healthcare" for the surgery (Count Eight); that Medemerge, 
in failing to obtain authorization, "acted with a willful and 
wanton disregard for the harm that would likely result to 
the plaintiff " (Count Nine); that the physician defendants 
"negligently and carelessly delayed in authorizing and/or 
obtaining authorization" for the back sur gery (Count Ten); 
and that they "acted with a willful and wanton disregard" in 
delaying authorization (Count Eleven). Another count 
alleges that Medemerge breached its duty to "screen, hire 
and employ capable and responsible individuals to serve as 
its agent, servants, and/or employees" (Count Six). 
 
U.S. Healthcare removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey. On December 
3, 1997, the District Court granted U.S. Healthcar e's 
motion to dismiss the counts against it (Counts 1-5, 7). 
Subsequently, Medemerge and the physician defendants 
moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts, 
which motion was granted on September 8, 1999. 
Pryzbowski now appeals both the December 3, 1997 
dismissal and the September 8, 1999 summary judgment 






A. Claims Against U.S. Healthcare 
 
There are two separate but related pr eemption issues 
that arise under ERISA, both of which are pr esented in this 
case. The application of express preemption, set forth in 
S 514(a) of ERISA, arises in connection with Pryzbowski's 
claims against Medemerge and the physician defendants. 
Her claims against U.S. Healthcare raise the issue of 
complete preemption, a jurisdictional concept based on 
S 502(a) of ERISA. 
 
We first consider Pryzbowski's challenge to the District 
Court's holding that removal was proper and that it had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against U.S. 
Healthcare because they were completely pr eempted under 
S 502(a) of ERISA. Pryzbowski's complaint, originally filed in 
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state court, appeared on its face to allege only state causes 
of action and named as defendants parties who wer e not 
completely diverse from Pryzbowski, ther eby displaying no 
obvious basis for removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1441. In Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers 
Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983), the 
Supreme Court stated, "where ther e is no diversity of 
citizenship between the parties [as in Pryzbowski's case] . . . 
the propriety of removal turns on whether the case falls 
within the original `federal question' jurisdiction of the 
United States district courts." 
 
Under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, federal question 
jurisdiction exists only when an issue of federal law 
appears on the face of the plaintiff 's complaint. The 
anticipation that a defendant may raise a federal defense 
will not confer federal question jurisdiction. On the other 
hand, "any complaint that comes within the scope of [a] 
federal cause of action necessarily `arises under' federal 
law" and is therefore completely pr eempted. Franchise Tax 
Bd., 463 U.S. at 24. The paradigmatic example of this 
extraordinary preemptive force isS 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C.S 185. See 
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). In 
Franchise Tax Board, the Court did not reach the question 
of complete preemption under ERISA because the claim 
asserted there was not within the original jurisdiction of the 
federal courts and therefore could not be removed by 
defendant to federal court. See 463 U.S. at 24-25. 
 
It was in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. T aylor, 481 U.S. 58 
(1987), that the Supreme Court faced the question "whether 
or not the Avco principle can be extended to statutes other 
than the LMRA in order to recharacterize a state law 
complaint displaced by S 502(a)(1)(B) as an action arising 
under federal law." Id. at 64. After noting the similarity 
between the language of ERISA and that of the LMRA, the 
Court concluded that Congress intended thatS 502(a) of 
ERISA be given the same extraordinary pr eemptive force as 
had been given to S 301 of LMRA. See id.  at 65. This 
conclusion from the statutory language was confirmed not 
only by the statements of one of the sponsors of ERISA but 
also by the Conference Report, which stated that all suits 
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"to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover 
benefits under the plan . . . are to be r egarded as arising 
under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to 
those brought under section 301 of the Labor -Management 
Relations Act of 1947." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 327 
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5107. 
Following the decision in Metropolitan Life, there can be no 
question that "causes of action within the scope of the civil 
enforcement provisions of S 502(a)[are] removable to federal 
court." Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 66. 
 
We do not understand Pryzbowski to be challenging the 
principle that such claims are completely pr eempted but to 
be arguing that the claims she asserts against U.S. 
Healthcare were not removable because they did not fit 
within S 502(a). Section 502(a) allows a beneficiary or 
participant of an ERISA-regulated plan to bring a civil 
action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of 
his plan, to enforce his rights under the ter ms of the plan, 
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of 
the plan." 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B). UnderS 502(a), a 
beneficiary may obtain accrued benefits due, a declaratory 
judgment about entitlement of benefits, or an injunction to 
require the administrator to pay benefits. See Pilot Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53 (1987). It follows that if 
Pryzbowski's claims fall within the scope of ERISA's civil 
enforcement provisions, they are completely preempted. 
 
This court has on several occasions consider ed whether 
a plaintiff 's claim against his or her HMO is completely 
preempted under ERISA. In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 
57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), we distinguished between 
claims directed to the "quality of the benefits [plaintiffs] 
received" and claims "that the plans err oneously withheld 
benefits due" or that seek "to enfor ce [plaintiffs'] rights 
under the terms of their respective plans or to clarify their 
rights to future benefits." Id. at 356. We stated that claims 
that merely attack the quality of benefits do not fall within 
the scope of S 502(a)'s enforcement pr ovisions and are not 
completely preempted, whereas claims challenging the 
quantum of benefits due under an ERISA-regulated plan 
are completely preempted under S 502(a)'s civil enforcement 
scheme. See id. at 356-57. We held that, because the 
 
                                8 
  
plaintiffs in Dukes alleged that the HMO failed to exercise 
reasonable care in providing medical treatment, their 
claims were not completely preempted. See id. at 358. 
 
Thereafter, in In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3d 
Cir. 1999), we applied the quality-quantity distinction in 
determining whether claims by parents against U.S. 
Healthcare based on the death of their newbor n baby were 
completely preempted. In making that decision, we relied 
upon the distinction made in Dukes between"an HMO's 
role in `arranging for medical treatment' rather than its role 
as a plan administrator determining what benefits are 
appropriate." Id. at 162 (quoting Dukes, 57 F.3d at 360). We 
held that U.S. Healthcare's adoption of a policy of 
discharging newborn infants within 24 hours after their 
delivery was essentially a medical determination that could 
be subject to a state-law medical malpractice action. See id. 
at 162-63. We also held that the HMO's alleged negligence 
in selecting, training, and supervising medical personnel 
implicated the quality of medical treatment. See id. at 163- 
64. Therefore, we concluded that none of the claims were 
completely preempted and we directed that the case be 
remanded to state court. See id. at 162-65. 
 
Most recently, in Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 237 
F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2000), we again applied the distinction 
between claims raising quality of care issues and claims 
raising quantity of benefits issues. Lazorko alleged that 
financial disincentives imposed by the HMO discouraged 
medical providers from hospitalizing a mentally ill 
beneficiary who later committed suicide. W e decided that 
this was a quality of care claim because "the denial of [the 
beneficiary's] request for hospitalization occurred in the 
course of a treatment decision, not in the administration of 
the [plaintiff 's and beneficiary's] plan generally." Id. at 250. 
Thus, we held that the plaintiffs' claim was not completely 
preempted under S 502(a). 
 
Though the quality-quantity distinction was helpful in 
those cases, we have acknowledged that the distinction 
would not always be clear. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358. We 
recognized that there might be a situation where the quality 
of the medical care provided would be so deficient that the 
beneficiary essentially would not have received any health 
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care benefit at all. See id. And in In re U.S. Healthcare, we 
noted that making the quality-quantity distinction would be 
particularly difficult when an HMO has acted as both a 
plan administrator and a provider of medical services. See 
193 F.3d at 162. 
 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Pegram v. 
Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000), suggests 
preferable terminology. Although that case concerned 
fiduciary acts under ERISA and not preemption, the 
distinction made there between "eligibility decisions," which 
"turn on the plan's coverage of a particular condition or 
medical procedure for its treatment," and "treatment 
decisions," which are choices in "diagnosing and treating a 
patent's [sic] condition," 120 S. Ct. at 2154, is equally 
applicable for complete preemption analysis. Regardless of 
the language used, the ultimate distinction to make for 
purposes of complete preemption is whether the claim 
challenges the administration of or eligibility for benefits, 
which falls within the scope of S 502(a) and is completely 
preempted, or the quality of the medical tr eatment 
performed, which may be the subject of a state action. 
 
This court has not had occasion to consider how a claim 
that the HMO or plan administrator delayed in the approval 
of benefits should be treated under ERISA. It is evident that 
a claim alleging that a physician knowingly delayed in 
performing urgent surgery on a patient whose appendix 
was about to rupture would relate to the quality of care, 
and not be subject to removal on the basis of complete 
preemption. On the other hand, a claim alleging that an 
HMO declined to approve certain requested medical 
services or treatment on the ground that they were not 
covered under the plan would manifestly be one regarding 
the proper administration of benefits. Such a claim, no 
matter how couched, is completely preempted and 
removable on that basis. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356 (noting 
that a claim that the plans erroneously withheld benefits 
due would be completely preempted); Jass v. Prudential 
Health Care Plans, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1488-89 (7th Cir. 
1996) (holding that a claim against an HMO's utilization 
review decision was completely preempted by ERISA). 
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In analyzing whether a claim falling between these poles 
is completely preempted, it is necessary to r efer to S 502(a). 
As the Court stated in Metropolitan Life , "Congress has 
clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action 
within the scope of the civil enforcement pr ovisions of 
S 502(a) removable to federal court." 481 U.S. at 66. 
Accordingly, we must examine Pryzbowski's claims against 
U.S. Healthcare to determine whether they could have been 
the subject of a civil enforcement action underS 502(a). 
 
Counts One through Five of Pryzbowski's complaint 
allege that U.S. Healthcare negligently and car elessly 
delayed approval of her surgery with Dr . Barolat, acted in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner in doing the same, 
acted in willful and wanton disregard of her health, acted 
in bad faith, and breached her health insurance contract. 
Underlying these allegations of delay is the policy adopted 
by U.S. Healthcare (and many other HMOs) r equiring 
beneficiaries either to use in-network specialists or to 
obtain approval from the HMO for out-of-network 
specialists. These activities fall within the r ealm of the 
administration of benefits. 
 
Had Pryzbowski sought to accelerate U.S. Healthcar e's 
approval of the use of out-of-network pr oviders, she could 
have sought an injunction under S 502(a) to enforce the 
benefits to which she was entitled under the plan, thereby 
using the provisions of the civil enfor cement scheme 
provided by Congress. There have been numerous cases in 
which the courts have issued preliminary injunctions under 
similar circumstances. See, e.g., Marro v. K-III 
Communications Corp., 943 F. Supp. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(granting preliminary injunction to compel plan 
administrator to precertify high dosage chemotherapy); 
Mattive v. Healthsource of Savannah, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 
1559 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (granting preliminary injunction 
enjoining plan administrator from denying coverage for 
high-dose chemotherapy); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 
716 F. Supp. 131 (D.N.J. 1989) (granting pr eliminary 
injunction enjoining plan administrator from denying 
coverage for autologous bone marrow transplant treatment). 
 
Pryzbowski's final claim against U.S. Healthcar e (Count 
Seven) alleges that it failed properly to hir e, train, and 
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supervise its employees "to make thoughtful and r easonable 
decisions as to healthcare." Amended Complaint, Count 7. 
Although ostensibly directed at the provision of medical 
treatment, a federal court may "look beyond the face of the 
complaint to determine whether a plaintif f has artfully 
pleaded his suit so as to couch a federal claim in terms of 
state law," Jass, 88 F.3d at 1488; accord Parrino v. FHP, 
Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1998); cf. Franchise Tax 
Bd., 463 U.S. at 22 (noting that "a plaintif f may not defeat 
removal [to federal court] by omitting to plead necessary 
federal questions in a complaint"). Inasmuch as Pryzbowski 
has not alleged that U.S. Healthcare or its employees 
engaged in any medical treatment with r egard to her, the 
alleged negligence by U.S. Healthcare in the hiring, 
training, and supervising of its employees necessarily 
concerns the administration of her benefits, U.S. 
Healthcare's only role in this case. It follows that Count 
Seven is also completely preempted under S 502(a) of 
ERISA. 
 
Pryzbowski contends that her claims are analogous to the 
claims made in Dukes and In re U.S. Healthcare, where we 
held that complete preemption was inapplicable and 
removal improper. In both cases, we recognized that the 
HMO had assumed the dual role of an administrator of 
benefits and a provider of medical services. In In re U.S. 
Healthcare, we held that the HMO's policy to discharge 
newborn infants within 24 hours was essentially a "medical 
determination of the appropriate level of care." 193 F.3d at 
163. We also held that the claim that the HMO was 
negligent in failing to provide an in-home visit by a 
pediatric nurse, despite having given assurances that such 
a visit would be provided, was directed at the HMO's 
function as medical provider. See id. at 164. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs' claims alleged medical malpractice and were not 
completely preempted by ERISA. In Dukes, the plaintiffs' 
claims centered on "the low quality of the medical 
treatment that they actually received." 57 F.3d at 357. They 
argued that the HMO was liable under an agency theory 
and also directly responsible for negligence in selecting, 
retaining, screening, monitoring and evaluating the 
personnel who actually provided the medical services. See 
id. at 352. We held that those claims did not involve failure 
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to provide benefits due under the ERISA plan and therefore 
were not completely preempted. 
 
In the case before us, as we note above, Pryzbowski's 
claims against U.S. Healthcare are limited to its delay in 
approving benefits, conduct falling squar ely within 
administrative function. A holding that Pryzbowski's claims 
against U.S. Healthcare are not completely preempted 
would open the door for legal challenges to cor e managed 
care practices (e.g., the policy of favoring in-network 
specialists over out-of-network specialists), which the 
Supreme Court eschewed in Pegram. Cf. 120 S. Ct. at 
2156-57 (rejecting claims attacking financial incentives 
behind HMO structure, in light of congr essional policy of 
promoting HMOs). We conclude that the District Court did 
not err in holding that the claims Pryzbowski asserts 
against U.S. Healthcare are completely pr eempted. It 
follows that the District Court properly exer cised subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case and dismissed the claims 
against U.S. Healthcare. 
 
We are not unaware that our holding that U.S. 
Healthcare will not be required to explain or defend the 
delay in provision of services to Pryzbowski may leave her, 
and other beneficiaries, without effective r elief for the 
improper administration of benefits. The delay attendant on 
the required preauthorization by HMOs has been a matter 
of public concern. In fact, this has led the Department of 
Labor recently to publish a long pending final rule that 
requires that claims seeking pretr eatment authorization for 
medical services must be decided within 15 days and that 
imposes other stringent time limits on appeals fr om adverse 
decisions. See 65 Fed. Reg. 70,245 (Nov. 21, 2000). While 
the new rule applies only to claims filed on or after Jan. 1, 
2002, it should serve to give notice to health car e 
administrators that ERISA not only provides pr otection 
from litigation arising from benefits administration but 
imposes certain responsibilities with r espect to such 
administration. 
 





Unlike U.S. Healthcare, Medemerge and the physician 
defendants do not contend that the claims against them are 
 
                                13 
  
completely preempted under S 502(a). Neither can their 
anticipated defense of express preemption under S 514(a) be 
the basis for removal of these claims. See Franchise Tax 
Bd., 463 U.S. at 23-27. As we stated in Dukes, "[w]hen the 
doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, but the 
plaintiff 's state claim is arguably preempted under S 514(a), 
the district court, being without removal jurisdiction, 
cannot resolve the dispute regarding preemption." Dukes, 
57 F.3d at 355. Federal jurisdiction over Pryzbowski's 
claims against Medemerge and the physician defendants, if 
it is to be sustained, must be based on another gr ound. 
 
In this case, the District Court did not rely on S 502(a) 
preemption for its jurisdiction over these defendants but 
instead exercised supplemental jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1367. That section authorizes a district court to 
exercise "supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 
that are so related to claims in the action within such 
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution." 28 U.S.C. S 1367(a). W e have interpreted this 
provision to require the following: (1) " `[t]he federal claims 
must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction;' " (2) " `[t]he state and federal claims must 
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact;' " and (3) 
" `the plaintiff 's claims [must be] such that [s/]he would 
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial 
proceeding.' " In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practices 
Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 302 (3d Cir . 1998) (quoting United 
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), which 
sustained the constitutionality of pendent jurisdiction). 
 
We have already determined that the District Court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over Pryzbowski's claims against 
U.S. Healthcare. Moreover, Pryzbowski's claims against 
Medemerge and the physician defendants ar e derived from 
the same factual predicate as her claims against U.S. 
Healthcare, as all her claims stem from the treatment she 
received from all of the defendants in r esponse to her 
complaint of back pain and the delay she experienced in 
securing the approval for the out-of-network physicians and 
services that Dr. Barolat believed wer e necessary. Under 
these circumstances, it would be expected that all of 
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Pryzbowski's claims against the defendants would be 
combined in one judicial proceeding. Ther efore, the District 
Court had the authority for its exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction over the claims against Medemer ge and the 
physician defendants. 
 
Pryzbowski argues that once the claims against U.S. 
Healthcare were dismissed, the District Court should have 
remanded her claims against the other defendants to state 
court. That was certainly an option for the District Court 
but not one it was obliged to take. In New Rock Asset 
Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 
F.3d 1492, 1506 (3d Cir. 1996), we stated that "where the 
jurisdiction-conferring party drops out and the federal court 
retains jurisdiction over what becomes a state law claim 
between non-diverse parties, the bounds of Article III have 
not been crossed." In such situations, district courts have 
discretion to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction. 
See id. 
 
Pryzbowski's challenge to the District Court's failure to 
remand seems to be directed exclusively to a lack of 
jurisdiction in the District Court. She has given us no 
persuasive reason why the District Court's decision to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction was an abuse of its 
discretion. The District Court had become fully familiar 
with the factual background and the positions of the 
parties, and we see no reason why it should not have 
continued to exercise jurisdiction over Pryzbowski's claims 
against Medemerge and the physician defendants. We 
certainly cannot conclude that its decision was an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
2. Summary Judgment 
 
Once the District Court dismissed the claims against U.S. 
Healthcare (Counts 1-5 and 7) and Counts 9 and 11 were 
dismissed without opposition, see Pryzbowski, 64 F. Supp. 
2d at 363 n.2, the parties focused their discovery on 
Counts 6 and 8 against Medemerge and Count 10 against 
Doctors Pilla and Ellis.1 The r emaining defendants then 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court dismissed the claims against Dr. Sgambelluri 
because Pryzbowski's brief in that court opposing summary judgment 
made no mention of that defendant. See Pryzbowski, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 
363 n.1. Her brief in this court does not mention that portion of the 
District Court's opinion, and we conclude that she does not challenge it. 
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moved for summary judgment. In support of their motion, 
defendants filed the certification of their counsel, Joseph R. 
Lang, who attached extensive documentary evidence and 
references to certain depositions. These documents set 
forth Pryzbowski's medical history in connection with her 
complaints of back pain and efforts to obtain the necessary 
treatment and services.2 The District Court noted that 
"plaintiff has not provided this court with any evidence 
whatsoever in opposing this motion but merely has 
referenced defendants' exhibits fr om time to time," and that 
it was "unable to consider unsupported conclusory 
allegations." Id. at 364 n.6. 
 
The District Court viewed the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment as having two bases. The first was that 
Pryzbowski's claims were preempted byS 514(a) of ERISA. 
The second was that Pryzbowski failed to state a claim for 
which relief can be granted. We consider them in turn. 
 
a. Express Preemption by S 514(a) 
 
Section 514(a), the express preemption pr ovision of 
ERISA, provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and all 
State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee 
benefit plan" covered by the statute. 29 U.S.C. S 1144(a). 
ERISA also includes a saving clause protecting from 
preemption state laws regulating insurance, banking, or 
securities. See 29 U.S.C. S 1144(b)(2)(A). As we have 
explained, "[u]nlike the scope of S 502(a)(1)(B), which is 
jurisdictional and creates a basis for r emoval to federal 
court, S 514(a) . . . governs the law that will apply to state 
law claims, regardless of whether the case is brought in 
state or federal court." Lazorko, 237 F .3d at 248. 
 
In one of the early cases to come before the Supreme 
Court concerning the express preemption provision, the 
Court stated that a law "relates to" an employee benefit 
plan "if it has a connection with or refer ence to such a 
plan." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 
(1983). The Court thereafter recognized that more guidance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. They are reviewed in detail in the District Court's opinion granting 
summary judgment, see Pryzbowski, 64 F . Supp. 2d at 363-66, and 
need not be reprised. 
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was needed in drawing the line between what was 
preempted and what was not. It attempted to do that in 
New York State Conference of Blue Cr oss & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) [hereafter 
Travelers], where the Court stated that it would inquire into 
"the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope 
of the state law that Congress understood would survive." 
Id. at 656. To that end, the Court noted that Congress 
intended: 
 
       to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be 
       subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was 
       to minimize the administrative and financial bur den of 
       complying with conflicting directives among States or 
       between States and the Federal Government . . . , [and 
       to prevent] the potential for conflict in substantive law 
       . . . requiring the tailoring of plans and employer 
       conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each 
       jurisdiction. 
 
Id. at 656-57 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 
U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (citation omitted) (ellipses and 
brackets in original)). Thus, the basic objective of the 
express preemption provision was"to avoid a multiplicity of 
regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform 
administration of employee benefit plans." Id. at 657. 
 
In Travelers and several cases ther eafter, the Court held 
that the challenged state statutes were not pr eempted 
because they were laws of general application that were 
neither directed to ERISA plans nor inter fered with their 
administration. For example, in Travelers  the Court held 
that a statute that imposed surcharges on hospital rates for 
patients with commercial insurance purchased by ERISA 
plans, which was intended to help Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
plans, had only an indirect economic ef fect on ERISA plans 
and was not expressly preempted by S 514(a). See id. at 
658-62; see also California Div. of Labor Standards 
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997) 
(state prevailing wage law does not "r elate to" employee 
benefit plans and is not preempted by ERISA where statute 
is indifferent to ERISA coverage); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA 
Med. and Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997) 
(generally applicable gross receipts tax on health care 
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facilities not preempted despite some bur den on 
administration of ERISA plans); but see Alessi v. Raybestos- 
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981) (state compensation 
act barring offset of workers' pension benefits by 
compensation benefits preempted). 
 
The issue of express preemption arises in other contexts 
than challenges to state statutes. One of the most frequent 
is the reliance by HMOs and insurance companies on 
S 514(a) in defending suits brought by beneficiaries arising 
out of the denial of plan benefits. This line of cases stems 
from the Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), where a beneficiary of an 
ERISA plan sued the insurance company that cover ed his 
employer's long-term disability employee benefit plan, 
alleging it improperly denied his claim for long-term 
disability benefits. He claimed tortious br each of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud in the inducement. 
Plaintiff sought to avoid preemption under S 514(a) by 
trying to fit some of his claims into the saving clause 
exception for state laws regulating insurance, but the Court 
rejected that effort. Instead, the Court viewed the common 
law causes of action raised in plaintiff 's complaint as based 
on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under 
an employee benefit plan, stated that such claims 
"undoubtedly meet the criteria for pre-emption under 
S 514(a)," and held that the suit could not proceed because 
of the "expansive sweep of the pre-emption clause." Id. at 
47-48. 
 
Thus, suits against HMOs and insurance companies for 
denial of benefits, even when the claim is couched in terms 
of common law negligence or breach of contract, have been 
held to be preempted by S 514(a). See, e.g., Bast v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 
1998) (holding that S 514(a) preempted, among other 
things, a claim alleging bad faith denial of benefits); Tolton 
v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941-43 (6th Cir. 
1995) (holding that S 514(a) preempted claims for wrongful 
death, medical malpractice, and insurance bad faith based 
on a refusal to authorize treatment); Corcoran v. United 
HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331-34 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that S 514(a) preempted a wr ongful death action 
based on the negligent denial of benefits). 
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The rationale for these holdings is that the decision 
whether a requested benefit or service is covered by the 
ERISA plan falls within the scope of the administrative 
responsibilities of the HMO or insurance company, and 
therefore "relates to" the employee benefit plan. The same 
rationale has been applied by courts holding that suits 
against HMOs for delay in authorizing benefits wer e 
preempted under S 514(a). For example, in Kuhl v. Lincoln 
Nat'l Health Plan of Kan. City, Inc., 999 F .2d 298, 302-03 
(8th Cir. 1993), the court considered a claim that the HMO 
canceled the beneficiary's surgery in an out-of-network 
hospital, thereby delaying his ability to r eceive treatment 
and leading to his death. Although the complaint br ought 
by his survivors alleged common law claims and 
characterized the HMO's actions as malpractice, the court 
viewed the claim as based on improper pr ocessing of 
medical benefits, and therefore expr essly preempted by 
S 514(a). See id. Likewise, in Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 
F.3d 129, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1993), the court held that a 
wrongful death claim based on the HMO's delay in 
authorizing cancer treatment was expressly preempted 
because it dealt with the negligent administration of 
benefits. 
 
In contrast, claims challenging the quality of car e are not 
preempted by S 514(a). As previously discussed, our 
decisions in Dukes, In re U.S. Healthcare, and Lazorko 
made clear our view that claims based on medical 
treatment decisions are still state law claims. In Dukes, we 
examined the legislative history of ERISA and found 
nothing suggesting that Congress intended "to control the 
quality of the benefits received by plan participants[,] . . . a 
field traditionally occupied by state regulation." 57 F.3d at 
357. We explained that: 
 
       When Congress enacted ERISA it was concer ned in 
       large part with the various mechanisms and 
       institutions involved in the funding and payment of 
       plan benefits. That is, Congress was concer ned "that 
       owing to the inadequacy of current minimum[financial 
       and administrative] standards, the soundness and 
       stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay 
       promised benefits may be endangered." S 2, 29 U.S.C. 
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       S 1001(a). Thus, Congress sought to assur e that 
       promised benefits would be available when plan 
       participants had need of them and S 502 was intended 
       to provide each individual participant with a r emedy in 
       the event that promises made by the plan wer e not 
       kept. 
 
Id. (brackets in original). 
 
We followed that view in In re U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d 
151, where we held that claims against the HMO resulting 
from its adoption of a policy to dischar ge newborns from 
the hospital within 24 hours after birth went to the quality 
of care provided. They were ther efore to be evaluated as an 
ordinary state-law tort claim for medical malpractice. There 
is no reason why the distinction between quality of care 
issues and benefits administration issues made in those 
cases, which arose in the context of complete preemption 
under S 502(a), would not be equally applicable to express 
preemption under S 514(a). 
 
Moreover, there is a strong suggestion in Pegram that 
claims based on medical treatment decisions r emain 
outside the preemptive effect of ERISA. In holding that 
mixed eligibility/treatment decisions made by an HMO are 
not encompassed by the fiduciary duties imposed by 
ERISA, the Court made clear its view that ERISA was not 
designed to allow plan participants "to bring malpractice 
actions in the guise of federal fiduciary br each claims 
against HMOs." 120 S. Ct. at 2158. The Court took a dim 
view of an interpretation that would lead to ERISA 
preemption covering "the subject of a state-law malpractice 
claim." 120 S. Ct. at 2158. 
 
The District Court here recognized that a malpractice 
claim by Pryzbowski against Medemerge and the physician 
defendants would not be preempted. However , that court, 
after conducting a comprehensive review of the relevant 
cases, concluded that "[i]t is clear that plaintiff 's claims, at 
their core, challenge the poor administration of her plan -- 
the failure to promptly approve the r equest for Dr. Barolat 
to perform the surgery -- rather than the quality of care 
she received. " 64 F. Supp. 2d at 369. The District Court 
also stated that "a claim for negligent delay in the 
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utilization review, or pre-authorization process, even if 
alleged as a state law violation against the physician, 
would, at the very least, `relate to' an ERISA plan and, thus, 
be preempted." Id. at 367. W e cannot agree that all of 
Pryzbowski's claims against Medemerge and the physician 
defendants should be characterized as "relating to" the 
administration of her plan. 
 
It is true that Pryzbowski has not alleged that the 
physician defendants at Medemerge failed to diagnose or 
properly treat her back pain. She concedes that those 
physicians found that her problem requir ed specialty care 
and referred her to an orthopedic sur geon, a neurosurgeon, 
and eventually the out-of-network neurosur geon who had 
originally performed surgery on Pryzbowski. On the other 
hand, Pryzbowski's claims against Medemerge and the 
physician defendants are not based on a denial of benefits 
and therefore differ from the typical administration of 
benefits claims against HMOs. Medemerge and the 
physician defendants do not contend that they acted as 
U.S. Healthcare's agent in the administration of the plan 
that covered Pryzbowski. Admittedly, they did not have the 
responsibility to make coverage decisions. Indeed, they 
argue in their brief that they had no power to authorize 
services by out-of-network physicians and that those 
questions -- which have been held to be administrative as 
to HMOs -- were always relayed to U.S. Healthcare. As 
these defendants disclaim any administrative authority or 
responsibility with respect to the plan, it follows that the 
preemption afforded by S 514(a) for claims "relating to" a 
plan is inapplicable. 
 
Our decisions have not focused on the extent to which 
the scope of a physician's responsibility to a patient goes 
beyond the mere treatment of that patient's medical 
complaint. It remains unclear whether the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would include within the physicians' duty 
of care the processing of their patients through the office, 
including matters such as the completion of for ms, referral 
to other physicians, arrangements for laboratory tests, and 
other general office procedures that may be necessary for 
the complete care of the patient. 
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We note that in Nealy v. U.S. Healthcar e HMO, 93 N.Y.2d 
209, 711 N.E.2d 621 (1999), a primary care physician 
allegedly delayed in submitting to the HMO a r equest for 
authorization for a beneficiary to see an out-of-network 
cardiologist. The HMO eventually denied authorization, and 
the beneficiary died before seeing an in-network 
cardiologist. The New York Court of Appeals held that the 
wrongful death and negligence claims br ought by the 
beneficiary's wife were not preempted byS 514(a). See id. at 
219, 711 N.E.2d at 625. The court stated that "[p]laintiff 's 
allegations of negligent medical care do not`relate to' the 
administration of an ERISA plan merely because they refer 
to [the physician defendant's] delay in submitting the US 
Healthcare form seeking a referral to [the out-of-network 
cardiologist]. Plaintiff does not allege that [the physician 
defendant] is responsible for delay caused by US 
Healthcare's decision-making process with respect to 
coverage or benefits. Her claim against [the physician 
defendant] is that he failed to take timely action to treat her 
husband." Id. at 219-20, 711 N.E.2d at 625 (footnote 
omitted). 
 
Nealy stands for the proposition that under New York law 
the physician's duties in providing car e to his/her patients 
may be broader than the mere medical tr eatment decision. 
Pryzbowski's complaint may be fairly read to allege that 
Medemerge and the physician defendants did not 
adequately perform or supervise the per formance of some 
of the office functions that may be part of patient care. On 
the sparse record before us and in view of the inadequate 
briefing on this point before us and in the District Court, 
we are not prepared to state as a matter of law that there 
is no conceivable malpractice claim against these 
defendants under New Jersey law, and hence cannot agree 




3. There are a number of pending motions. The appellees have moved to 
dismiss the appeal or in the alternative to strike the appellant's brief 
and 
appendix because Pryzbowski included in the Joint Appendix excerpts of 
the deposition testimony of Dr. Linda Peeno, her medical ethics expert, 
Anita McGinley, former HMO coordinator at Medemerge, Sandra Coles- 
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b. Failure to State a Claim 
 
Our decision that Pryzbowski's claims against Medemerge 
and the physician defendants are not expr essly preempted 
does not mean that they necessarily survive dismissal 
under summary judgment. Only after the District Court 
determines the scope of New Jersey malpractice law will it 
be able to decide whether Pryzbowski has offer ed sufficient 
evidence to make a genuine issue of material fact that 
Medemerge and the physician defendants failed to meet the 
applicable standard. 
 
There is one claim, however, that we ar e in a position to 
resolve. The District Court held that Pryzbowski failed to 
state a claim for negligence upon which relief can be 
granted. The District Court equated the negligence claim 
with Pryzbowski's contention that the physician defendants 
violated a state common law "duty to advocate" to the HMO 
so as to expedite the approval of her sur gery. Although we 
read Pryzbowski's negligence claim against Medemerge and 
the physician defendants as broader than the claimed duty 
to advocate, we agree with the District Court's analysis of 
the latter. 
 
The District Court reasoned that a state law claim for 
negligence must allege "(1) a duty of car e owed by 
defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by 
defendant; and (3) an injury to plaintiff pr oximately caused 
by defendant's breach." Endre v. Arnold, 300 N.J. Super. 
136, 142, 692 A.2d 97, 100 (App. Div. 1997). "Whether a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Forbes, nurse employed by U.S. Healthcare to r eview out-of-network 
authorizations, and Dr. John Pilla of Medemer ge that were not put in the 
record developed in the District Court. In turn, Pryzbowski has moved to 
expand the record to include portions of the depositions that were not 
before the District Court, or, in the alternative, that we ignore the 
references to the material at issue. W e have consistently stated that the 
courts of appeals can only "review the decision below based on the 
record that was before the district court." Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I 
Rubin & Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1270, 1284 (3d Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). 
Therefore, we have not considered these deposition excerpts in making 
our decision. On remand, the District Court can reconsider whether the 
excerpts are material to its inquiry. W e deny both the motion to dismiss 
the appeal and deny the motion to expand the r ecord. 
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duty exists is solely a question of law to be decided by a 
court." Id. The Medical Society of New Jersey filed an 
amicus curiae brief in this court to advance its position 
that a physician does not, and should not, have a"duty to 
advocate" with a patient's health care plan when it denies 
or delays treatment the physician has r equested. 
Pryzbowski attempts to identify such a duty thr ough her 
medical ethics expert, the Hippocratic Oath, and the 
American Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics. The 
Medical Society, besides providing the surprising 
information that the Hippocratic Oath is not universally 
used throughout the medical schools of this country and 
that there are at least ten versions of that oath, asserts that 
there is no "legal duty that subjects physicians who have 
committed no malpractice to liability for injuries r esulting 
from delays in benefit determinations by plan 
administrators over whom the physicians have no control." 
Br. of Medical Society at 8-9 (emphasis in original). 
 
We take no position whether New Jersey, or any other 
state, should impose such a duty, as that is not within our 
domain. On the issue before us, we agree that physicians, 
under existing New Jersey law, have no duty to advocate on 
behalf of their patients to an HMO or any health insurance 
plan for the timely approval of benefits. Cf. Baxt v. Liloia, 
155 N.J. 190, 202, 714 A.2d 271, 277 (1998) (noting that 
state disciplinary codes for attorneys "ar e not designed to 
establish standards for civil liability"); Pierce v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 76, 417 A.2d 505, 514 
(1980) (concluding that the Hippocratic Oath "does not 
contain a clear mandate of public policy" upon which a 
cause of action may be based). We ther efore agree with the 
District Court that Pryzbowski has failed to state a claim on 






In summary, we hold that the District Court did not err 
in holding that Pryzbowski's claims against U.S. Healthcare 
were completely preempted; that New Jersey does not 
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recognize a physician's duty to advocate; and that the other 
claims asserted by Pryzbowski against Medemer ge and the 
physician defendants are not expressly pr eempted as a 
matter of law but require additional consideration by the 
District Court. 
 
We note that, as a result of the enactment of ERISA and 
the substantial changes in the delivery of health care, new 
legal issues regarding rights and r esponsibilities have 
arisen. The law remains, to some extent, in a state of flux. 
It is for Congress and not the courts to decide whether it is 
sound policy for our health care system to limit or channel 
the relief available or whether ERISA should allow for 
broader remedies for beneficiaries in the world of managed 
care. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
December 3, 1997 order dismissing the claims against U.S. 
Healthcare. We will affirm that portion of the order of 
September 8, 1999 dismissing the claims against 
Medemerge and the physician defendants insofar as they 
allege duty to advocate, and we will vacate the r emainder of 
that order and remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
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